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Managing the Relative Volumes of Participating and 
Nonparticipating Business in a Mutual Life Company 
Robert G. Chadburn* 
Abstract** 
Management decisions of a mutual life company involving the amounts and rela-
tive proportions of participating (with profits) and nonparticipating (without profits) 
business and the level of expenses are examined in relation to their effect on partici-
pating policyholders' returns. A particular expense ratio is defined that plays a key 
role in a framework for making such decisions. The sensitivity of participating policy 
returns to changes in each factor are analyzed. Companies with expense ratios (as 
defined) of less than 2 are shown to prefer a different strategy from companies with 
higher ratios. There is an incomplete tendency for the ratio to stabilize either at unity 
or to tend to infinity. The practical implications and limitations of the approach are 
considered. 
Key words: decision making; expenses; new business 
1 Introduction 
This paper concerns certain management decisions relating to 
mutual life companies (offices); the position regarding stock 
(proprietary) companies is different and is only briefly discussed. 
A United Kingdom (U.K.) environment is assumed, although the 
circumstances are general enough to make the conclusions appropriate 
to other countries, including the United States. Some of the comments 
made and procedures adopted in the paper, however, reflect pecu-
liarities of the U.K. (including methods of dividend distribution, 
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London, since 1989. He has a Ph.D. in population genetics from Liverpool University 
(1986) and obtained his F.I.A. in 1990. His practical actuarial experience was with the 
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especially solvency and profit distribution. 
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product design, and statutory regulation). Brief descriptions of these 
features will be given to assist non-U.K. readers. 
In the U.K., participating (with profits) policyholders' divi-
dends are paid in two forms, referred to as reversionary and terminal 
bonuses. Reversionary bonuses are additions to the contractual policy 
benefit; they usually are made annually, at the discretion of the 
company's actuary, to reflect a proportion of the surplus earned dur-
ing the previous year. Terminal bonuses are added at the claim date 
of the policy, again at the discretion of the actuary, so that the 
total policy benefit on maturity of a policy will be equal to the poli-
cy's asset share plus an element of smoothing. In a mutual company 
the return to the participating policyholder also will include a share 
in the company's profits or losses from other sources, such as those 
generated by nonparticipating business, plus any contribution made to 
or from the estate. 
The nature of the statutory regulations regarding the valuation of 
assets and liabilities combined with the particular features of the 
participating business described above result in different patterns of 
emergence of statutory surplus. Nonparticipating (without profit) 
business generally produces large initial surplus strains, followed by 
small regular profits emerging in subsequent years. The large strains, 
however, can be reduced by modern product designs. Participating 
business, for which reserves only are required for the contractual ben-
efit plus declared bonuses, lead to reduced or even nonzero initial 
strains, followed by relatively large contributions to statutory surplus 
for a considerable period of the policy's duration. A large strain then 
is produced at the claim date when the terminal bonus becomes 
payable. As a result, the issue of new participating business will tend 
to improve the statutory surplus position, while the issue of nonpar-
ticipating business will tend to have the opposite effect. This is a 
factor that will bear on later discussion. 
In the U.K., traditional nonparticipating business such as term 
and whole life insurances do not constitute much of a mutual com-
pany's portfolio. A considerable and possibly increasing volume of 
business consists of unit-linked contracts.1 Later in the paper situa-
tions are hypothesized in which 35 percent or more of a mutual com-
pany's portfolio consists of nonparticipating business. While such a 
proportion may have been unlikely historically, more recently this 
would not be an incredible figure for some firms. 
1 In a unit-linked insurance contract, premiums (after deductions for expense and claim 
charges) are allocated to units, the value of which directly reflect the returns 
obtained from a specific pool of assets. The charges represent the nonparticipating 
premium to the company for these contracts 
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The decisions considered in this paper are those that ultimately 
have an effect upon the volumes of new participating and nonpartici-
pating business issued by a mutual company and in the management of 
expense levels. 
According to a basic principle of economics, the more units of 
product that are sold at the same price for a fixed level of expense, 
the greater will be the profit per unit sold. Furthermore, an increase 
in expense levels if accompanied by a greater proportionate increase 
in units sold will increase unit-profit. This is referred to as economies 
of scale. 
In the life insurance business, units of product (policies) are sold, 
at least partly, with the aim of making a profit and with the 
knowledge that the activities of selling and managing the business 
involve expenses that offset profit. A stock company issuing nonpar-
ticipating policies will conform ultimately to the basic economic 
principles stated above, as will a nonparticipating portfolio within a 
mutual company. 
A mutual company, which must have a significant portfolio of 
participating policyholders on its books, is in an unusual position. As 
a mutual, all profits earned by both the participating and nonpartic-
ipating portfolios must be distributed (ultimately) to the participat-
ing policyholders. This means that while increasing the number of 
participating units sold for a given level of expense will reduce the 
average cost for each unit sold (thereby increasing unit profit), it also 
will reduce each unit's share of the profits earned by the nonpartici-
pating portfolio (thereby decreasing unit profit). The position of the 
mutual company is therefore more complex than the position of a 
nonparticipating stock company case. The overall profitability of a 
mutual company depends on the relative levels of profit from the 
nonparticipating portfolio compared with the level of expenses. It is 
this position that will be explored in section 3 of this paper. 
Profit is not the only consideration of importance to management 
when arriving at decisions that may affect business volume. For 
example, the mutual company at all times must maintain a sufficient 
statutory surplus both to satisfy the regulators and to make invest-
ments that are in the best long-term interests of the policyholders, 
including investment in the issue of new nonparticipating contracts. 
This surplus is provided by the existence of a participating portfolio, 
as well as from profits retained from earlier generations of policy-
holders. A certain relative level of participating business is neces-
sary; without it, a mutual company could not exist. 
There are also factors at work in the market that may affect 
business volume irrespective of any other ambitions the management 
29 
R.G. Chadburn Participating and Nonparticipating Business in Mutual Life 
may have. For example, sales of nonparticipating contracts may be 
affected by premium rate, while sales of participating policies may 
be influenced by historical and current profitability. Customer prefer-
ences for products may change over time, and changes to tax legisla-
tion (e.g., removal of tax reliefs on insurance premiums) dramatically 
can influence sales volume. These factors must be borne in mind when 
considering the implications of the results described in this paper. 
The present analysis will need to distinguish between two types 
of expenses: proportionate and nonproportionate expenses:2 
a) Proportionate expenses are variable expenses associated with par-
ticipating and nonparticipating portfolios, and these expenses are 
proportionate to the volumes of business sold. 
b) Nonproportionate expenses are the remaining expenses, consisting of 
other variable expenses and fixed expenses. Nonproportionate 
expenses can be considered as expenses that colfechvely vary 
with the decision made, but not necessarily in proportion to any 
change in volume of business resulting from the decision. 
For example, a particular management decision may lead to an 
increase in nonproportionate expenses of X percent, coupled with an 
increase in nonparticipating sales of Y percent; X and Yare not linked 
to each other in any way other than that they are both dependent 
upon the decision made. A mutual company attempting to expand its 
operations to produce economies of scale may be faced with such a 
decision set. As will be seen in section 3 below, it is always best to 
choose the decision that produces the greatest increase in sales for 
the smallest increase in nonproportionate expenses, everything else 
being equal. 
2 Construction of Total Profit 
All references to present values refer to a time ongm (time 0) 
unless otherwise stated. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed 
that the discount rate used to calculate present values is equal to the 
rate of investment return earned over the lifetime of the portfolio. 
Further, without loss of generality, it is assumed that the mutual 
2 Chalke (1991) considers expenses at any decision point to be "nonmarginal" if they 
are invariable by any of the possible decisions made. Expenses that vary according to 
the decision made are described as "marginal expenses." Ramsay (1991), in his com-
ment on Chalke's paper, points out that these expenses more appropriately are 
described as "fixed' and "variable" respectively, in accordance with more traditional 
parlance. Chalke notes that fixed expenses at one decision point may become the 
variable expenses of the next decision point. 
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company's business consists of one tranche3 of nonparticipating busi-
ness and one tranche of participating business, all issued at time 0.4 
The policies within each tranche are assumed to be identical. The 
company is assumed to incur three distinct types of expenses: 
a) Proportionate expenses of the nonparticipating business; 
b) Proportionate expenses of the participating business; 
c) Nonproportionate expenses. 
The management also has ultimate control of business volume, sepa-
rately for each tranche. 
Three types of profit, Pn , Plo' and P~, need to be defined. 
Pn = Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of pro-
portionate expenses) earned by a single nonparticipating pol-
ICY issued at time 0; 
Plo Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of pro-
portionate expenses) earned by a single participating policy 
Issued at time 0; and 
P~ = Actuarial present value of the marginal profits earned by a 
single participating policy including the value of the benefit 
payments. 
Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the method used to cal-
culate Pn and Pw. 
While in reality individual policies, even of the same size and 
type, earn different profits (e.g., due to different dates of claim), it is 
assumed that each policy earns the same average (or expected) 
profit. The effect of changes in business volume on profit variability 
is not considered in this paper. 
It is assumed that marginal profits are fixed and independent of 
sales volume. In practice this is not entirely true: cheaper products 
are easier to sell, but will have lower marginal profit. In the present 
context it is helpful to think of the nonparticipating business as a 
body of unit-linked policies with premium rates that are effectively 
the charges deducted from the policy benefits. In these cases, policy 
sales depend more on expected investment returns obtained from the 
policyholder's unit-holding than upon the rates of charge levied to 
3 Here tranche refers to business issued within a specific and limited time period. 
4 Similar conclusions could be drawn assuming the company is in a stationary position, 
in real terms, issuing constant volumes of new business each year. A single tranche 
model, however, is much easier to visualize. 
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cover expenses and other costs, at least up to a point. Hence, an 
assumption of invariant marginal profit per policy can be justified for 
the purpose of illustrating the point of interest in this paper. The 
effect of introducing a price/volume relationship for the nonpartici-
pating business in the model is an aspect worthy of further investiga-
tion. 
Let 
N n = Number of nonparticipating policies issued at time 0; 
N w Number of participating policies issued at time 0; 
E(n) Actuarial present value of all future nonproportionate 
expenses (with respect to these two tranches of business). 
The present value of the company's future retained profits from the 
two tranches, TP, then is given by: 
Because, over the lifetime of the business, all the profits earned by 
the two tranches are paid to the participating policyholders in pol-
icy benefits,S it follows that TP = O. 
Let c be the present value of future benefits paid to a single par-
ticipating policy (assumed to be the same for all participating poli-
cies), then P~ is given by 
P~ = Pw + c. 
P~ can be considered as the value of future premiums, less 
proportionate expenses, plus the policy's returns on investment. 
Hence: 
or 
c = P~ + (1) 
5 This may not always be the case. Smoothing participating policy returns may result 
in more or less than asset shares being paid, while there may be a strategy to expand 
or contract the estate for good management reasons. Because policy benefits are 
designed to follow asset shares and the estate is ultimately a policyholder asset, then 
it seems appropriate to assume that, on average, TP = O. 
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In other words, the present value of the benefits under a single par-
ticipating policy is equal to the value of its premiums, including 
investment income and net of proportionate expenses, plus that pol-
icy's share of the profits from the tranche of nonparticipating poli-
cies, less that policy's share of the nonproportionate expenses of the 
company. 
From equation (1) it easily can be seen that increasing the volume 
of nonparticipating business Nn , or reducing the amount of nonpropor-
tionate expenses E(n), will increase the return to the individual par-
ticipating policyholder c. Increasing the volume of participating 
business only will increase returns, however, if (NI1 PI1 - E(l1)) is nega-
tive. That is, the ratio E(l1) I(N n Pn) is greater than unity. This ratio 
will be referred as R, or as the expense ratio, 
E(I1) 
R= N P 
n n 
and it represents the extent to which the non proportionate expenses 
of the portfolio are covered by the nonparticipating business. 
The rest of this paper is concerned with identifying the relative 
effects of varying N n , NWI and E(I1) on participating policy returns for 
different values of R. In addition, the paper establishes a framework 
for the construction of management decisions for companies with par-
ticular expense ratios subject to different business prospects. 
3 Controlling the Variables to Maintain or Improve 
Per Policy Profit 
3.1 The Variables 
It will be assumed that at time 0 management can make decisions 
that affect N n' N w , E(n), or any combination of these quantities. 
Equation (2) below represents the value of the participating per pol-
icy returns (subsequently referred to as per policy returns) after changes 
in each of these variables, 
(2) 
-1 ::; a~n), lXn < 00 and aw > -1, 
where an' aw , a~n), and ac are parameters indicating the proportional 
changes in the number of nonparticipating policies, number of 
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participating policies, nonparticipating expenses, and per policy 
returns respectively. 
3.2 Maintaining Returns 
Whenever conditions change, it is reasonable to assume that the 
aim of management will be to ensure that per policy returns do not 
fall, (i.e., to ensure that ac is never negative). Subtracting equation 
(1) from equation (2) yields: 
which implies: 
(3) 
It is instructive to examine the behavior of ac with respect to the 
other parameters. From equation (3), 
(4) 
because the constants c and N w are positive and N n and Pn are non-
negative. Notice that the right side of equation (4) is independent of 
an, a~n), and R. Thus, returns increase at a constant rate for any 
change in these quantities. 
Similarly, 
(5) 
and 
(6) 
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From equation (5), returns (as a function of aw) either are decreasing, 
zero, or increasing if R < 1, R = 1, or R > 1, respectively. Finally, from 
equation (6) we see that for a given aw, returns decrease at a constant 
rate regardless of the level of a~n). 
Let us now investigate the behavior of a/u a w, and a~n) when 
there is no change in the level of returns; that is, when ac = O. First, 
setting ac = 0 in equation (3) yields : 
(7) 
That is, to maintain returns, the proportional change in the number of 
nonparticipating policies (an) must be a weighted average of the 
proportional change in the number of participating policies (aw) and 
the change in nonproportional expenses (aJn). Here the weights can 
be negative (if R > 1). When 0 < R < 1, in order for returns to be 
maintained, nonparticipating business has to be increased in response 
to increases in both expenses and participating business. Decreases in 
E(n) and N w would allow nonparticipating volume to fall while 
maintaining returns. 
Consider the following pairs of parameters: (a/uaw), (an' a~n), 
and (aw,a~n) in equation (7), subject to the third parameter being set 
equal to zero. Define fx/y as: 
ax fx/y = a 
y 
(8) 
where (ax,ay) is one of the pairs of parameters listed above and sub-
ject to the constraints of equation (7). In other words, ax is the change 
in the factor identified by x which is exactly sufficient to maintain 
returns (i.e., ac = 0) following a change of ay in the factor identified 
by y and no change in the third factor in equation (7). 
Definition 1 
When / f / < 1, the response is termed efficient; when / f / ;? 1, the 
response is termed inefficient. 
Definition 2 
If I fx/z / < / fy/z I, then a change in z is compensated for more efficiently 
(or less inefficiently) by changing x rather than y. 
Consider the pair (an,aw). By setting a~n) = 0 in equation (7), we 
have an = (l-R)aw which implies that: 
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an 
- = In/w = (1-R) 
aw 
Similarly, setting a w = 0 gives an = Ra~n) and 
an a~n) = In/e = R 
while setting an = 0 gives (1-R)aw + Ra~n) = 0 and 
a,V R a~n) = Jw/e = R - 1 . 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
The following results are derived easily from Definition 1: 
In/w = (l-R) 
In/e = R 
R 
Jw/e = R-l 
Efficient Region 
0<R<2 
0< R < 1 
0< R < 1/2 
Inefficient Region 
R ~ 2 
R ~ 1 
R ~ 1/2. 
Tables 1 through 3 display summary information on the effects of con-
trolling various parameters to maintain per policy returns. 
TABLE 1 
Summary of the Nonparticipating Business Response With Respect to Changes in 
Expenses and Volume of Participating Business in Order to Maintain per Policy Returns 
R 
(0,1/2) 
(1/2, 1) 
(1,2) 
(2,00) 
INC = Increase 
DEC = Decrease 
E = Efficient 
I = Inefficient 
Nonparticipating 
Response 
INC 
INC 
INC 
INC 
Due to 
Nonparticipating: 
INC 
INC 
DEC 
DEC 
36 
E 
E 
E 
I 
Due to 
Expenses: 
INC 
INC 
INC 
INC 
E 
E 
I 
I 
Notes 
'nlw> 'nle 
'nle> 'n/w 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of the Participating Business Response 
With Respect to Changes in Expenses 
R 
(0,1/2) 
(1/2, 1) 
(1,2) 
(2,00) 
and Volume of Nonparticipating Business 
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns 
Participating Due to Due to 
Response Nonparticipating: Expenses: 
DEC DEC I INC E 
DEC DEC I INC I 
INC DEC I INC I 
INC DEC E INC I 
For key, see bottom of Table 1 
TABLE 3 
Notes 
No solution where 
R(1+ ae) > (1+ an) 
Summary of the Expenses Response With Respect to 
Changes in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and Participating Business 
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns 
Expenses Due to Due to 
R Response Participating: Nonparticipating: Notes 
(0,1/2) DEC INC I DEC I No solution where 
(1/2,1) DEC INC E DEC I an < aw- R(1+ aw) 
~1, 2) DEC DEC E DEC E 
2,00) DEC DEC E DEC E 
For key, see bottom of Table 1 
4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The extent to which changes in the three factors affect the per 
policy returns now will be analyzed using a hypothetical model com-
pany. 
The model company is composed entirely of 10 year annual pre-
mium pure endowments, with one tranche in unit-linked 
(nonparticipating) form, the other as participating. The methodology 
used to calculate P n , P~, and E(n) are described fully in Appendix 1. 
The assumptions used to calculate Pn and Pz~ are given in Appendix 2. 
These assumptions lead to Pn = £255.69; P~ = £3517.45 
The present value of future nonproportionate expenses E(n) is cal-
culated such that Pn less one policy's share of these expenses is equal 
to 50 percent of the initial commission (IC), i.e., 
E(n) 
0.5 x Ie = P n - N + N . 
n w 
This implies that: 
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E(n) = (Nn + Nw) (Pn - 0.5 x Ie) 
(according to these assumptions). 
The present value of the participating maturity benefit c is calcu-
lated according to equation (1). The participating policy is assumed 
to have a sum assured S such that a compound reversionary bonus of 5 
percent per annum (with no terminal bonus) will lead to the implied 
maturity value of c x (1.1)10, i.e., 
(
1.1 )10 
S = c x 1.05 . 
The analysis involves calculating c(l + (Xc) using equation (2), pro-
duced for values of (Xc of +0.5 and -0.5, for each of the three factors in 
turn for R = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0. Note that (Xc can be expressed 
in terms of the implied revised reversionary bonus rate (r), which 
satisfies: 
The results are given in Table 4, and the changed values of R which 
correspond to these revised bonus rates are given in Table 5. 
TABLE 4 
Implied Reversionary Bonus Yields Percent for 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses 
and in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and PartiCipating Business According to the 
Model Described in Section 4 and Appendix 1 
Nw = 1000 throughout (A value of 5 percent indicates no change in yield) 
R Nn an = aw= af.n) -e -
0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
0.50 4771.00 6.46 3.33 4.47 6.46 4.20 5.75 
0.75 1228.00 5.45 4.53 4.92 5.23 4.65 5.34 
1.00 704.62 5.27 4.73 5.00 5.00 4.73 5.27 
1.50 380.40 5.15 4.85 5.05 4.85 4.78 5.22 
2.00 260.50 5.10 4.90 5.07 4.60 4.80 5.20 
3.00 159.80 5.06 4.94 5.08 4.75 4.81 5.19 
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TABLES 
Changes to the Expense Ratio RAfter 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses and in 
the Volumes 
of Nonparticipating and Participating Business, 
Where These Values Correspond to the Same Changed Situations That Produce the 
Yields Shown in Table 4 at any Given Value of R 
an= aw= 
0.5 -D.S 0.5 -0.5 
0.67A 2R R R 1.SR O.SR 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Interpretation of the Results 
In this section reference will be made particularly to Tables 1 to 4 
and to equations (9) to (11). 
Consider first Table 4. Sensitivity to changes varies both accord-
ing to the company' expense ratio, R, and according to the factor 
involved. Returns become extremely sensitive at expense ratios below 
0.5. But as these values imply high nonparticipating volumes coupled 
with low expenses, ratios in this region are unlikely in mutual life 
companies, which need a substantial volume of participating business 
to be viable. 
As a general observation, yield becomes less sensitive to changes 
the higher is the expense ratio. At values of R above about 1.5 the 
improvements in yield due to increasing the volume of either types of 
business are barely appreciable. For these values of R, the greatest 
improvements are achieved by reducing nonproportionate expense 
levels. 
At values of R above about 2, the most significant adverse effect 
is due to a decrease in the volume of participating business; hence, 
maintaining the volume of this business should be of most concern to a 
company with such a ratio. From Definition 2, Ife/w I < Ifn/w I indi-
cates that an unavoidable fall in participating volume is much more 
efficiently dealt with by decreasing expenses than by increasing non-
participating volume. This difference in efficiency becomes more 
marked for increasingly large values of R. Similarly, an increase in 
expenses is compensated for more efficiently by increasing participat-
ing rather than nonparticipating volume ( Ifw!e I < 1;;1!e I ). 
Offices with ratios between 1 and 2 should become more concerned 
with falls in nonparticipating volume and increases in expense levels. 
Reducing expense levels is a much more efficient way of compensating 
for a fall in nonparticipating volume than increasing participating 
volume ( I fe/n I < I fw/n I ). At ratios close to unity, varying the partic-
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ipating volume will have almost no effect on yield. There is no effi-
cient way to deal with increasing expenses at these ratios; hence, 
this would appear to be the most significant problem. If increasing 
expenses is unavoidable, then increasing the nonparticipating volume 
is the least inefficient way of compensating ( I fn/e I < I fw/e I). The 
greatest improvements at these ratios can be achieved by increasing 
nonparticipating volume or by decreasing the nonproportionate 
expenses. 
At ratios below unity a rather peculiar and apparently unstable 
situation exists, as per policy returns increase with a fall in partici-
pating volume, reflecting the increased share of the (positive) value 
of (N n Pn - E(n») per participating policy. Returns become increasingly 
sensitive to changes in all factors, but particularly to changes in the 
nonparticipating volume. There is no efficient way of compensating 
for a fall in nonparticipating volume at these levels-it is of particu-
lar concern to management to maintain nonparticipating volume here. 
Between ratios of 0.5 and I, I fe/n I < I fw/n I , i.e., it is less inefficient 
to compensate for falling nonparticipating business by reducing 
expenses than by decreasing participating sales; however, the oppo-
site is the case for the (rather unlikely) situation where the expense 
ratio is below 0.5. 
At ratios below unity, I fn/e I < I, so that an increase in expenses 
can be compensated for efficiently by increasing nonparticipating vol-
ume. Reducing the participating business is also an efficient way of 
dealing with increased expenses at ratios below 0.5, although the 
nonparticipating route is always the most efficient method. 
5.2 Consequences of Management Decisions 
A company with an expense ratio exceeding 2 would be most con-
cerned with maintaining and increasing participating sales and con-
trolling expenses. Economies of scale are easier to achieve using par-
ticipating sales the larger the value of the expense ratio. But in all 
cases, a greater proportionate increase in sales than in expenses is 
needed to secure these economies. These actions would tend to increase 
the expense ratio, making it proportionately easier to achieve fur-
ther economies of scale. The high ratio position persists and tends to 
become increasingly stable as R ~ 00. 
At expense ratios in the region 1 < R < 2, it becomes increasingly 
easier (in proportionate terms) to maintain or to improve returns by 
increasing nonparticipating business or by reducing expenses. 
Economies of scale best would be achieved by increasing nonpartici-
pating sales, although the proportionate increase in sales has to be 
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larger than that of the expenses. All these actions would result in 
yet lower expense ratios, making economies of scale easier to achieve 
and hence continuing the reduction in expense ratio to unity. Any 
attempt to obtain economies of scale by increasing the participating 
portfolio becomes increasingly difficult and inefficient, the closer the 
expense ratio is to 1 from 2. If successful, though, such an action 
would tend to increase the ratio. 
At expense ratios below unity, economies of scale can be achieved 
efficiently by increasing the nonparticipating business (i.e., if the 
result of the decision is for 1 > an > In/e X akn). This action (i.e., 
efficiently producing economies of scale) would tend to increase the 
expense ratio toward unity. Even greater returns could be achieved if 
an > I, in which case the ratio will reduce. Participating sales, 
however, cannot be increased without lowering per policy profit (or 
at least without increasing the nonparticipating portfolio sufficiently 
to compensate for the losses). On the other hand, a company in such a 
position may be providing higher returns than its market 
competitors, other things being equal. Such returns would make the 
company attractive to new participating policyholders, who would 
accept a fall in per policy profit just to obtain a share of some of it; 
alternatively, the company could be a potential candidate for 
demutualization. Hence, market forces could act to increase the 
participating portfolio-if this ultimately leads to increases in non-
proportionate expenses, then this also will increase the expense 
ratio. Another alternative is for the company to reduce its nonpartic-
ipating premium rates (or charges), which would tend to increase the 
expense ratio as Pn would be reduced. This effectively transfers some 
of the superprofits to the nonparticipating policyholders, an action 
that might be required on the grounds of equity. The need to maintain 
the participating portfolio in order to provide an adequate statutory 
surplus also should be borne in mind. 
If the only consideration of management is to increase per policy 
returns, then once R < 1 the optimum decision would be to reduce the 
participating portfolio down to one policy. Market forces, coupled 
with the company's need to provide capital, would tend to reverse 
the trend. The ultimate position (Le., value of R) at which a com-
pany would tend to maintain itself would be largely dependent upon 
the market level of per policy profits expected from participating 
policies, although there is a partially stable point at R = 1 caused 
by attempts to produce economies of scale through efficient increases 
to the nonparticipating portfolio. 
41 
R.G. Chadburn Participating and Nonparticipating Business in Mutual Life 
There are two distinct strategies that a company can adopt to 
maintain a required level of profit, associated respectively with low 
and high expense ratios. 
a) Low Ratio Strategy-A company with an expense ratio in the 
region of unity would be in a highly manageable position. With 
all nonproportionate expenses covered by nonparticipating busi-
ness, participating volume can be increased or decreased with no 
change to returns, provided the statutory solvency position is not 
compromised by any decrease in volume. Control of per policy 
profit would rest entirely with controlling the volume of nonpar-
ticipating business and level of nonproportionate expenses (and in 
controlling the expense ratio). Market demand for profit levels 
would tend to dIctate where the ratio ultimately would lie, 
although pursuit of economies of scale introduces a partial opti-
mum expense ratio at unity itself. 
b) High Ratio Strategy-A company with a high expense ratio 
implies that nonparticipating business is essentially an insignifi-
cant proportion of the portfolio. Control of per policy profit 
would rest almost entirely with controlling the volume of partic-
ipating business and the level of nonproportionate expenses, 
while pursuit of economies of scale would tend to increase the 
expense ratio still further. 
5.3 Practical Implications 
The main implications from the above are for mutual life compa-
nies that maintain significant volumes of nonparticipating (including 
unit-linked) business, implying low expense ratios and hence requiring 
a low ratio strategy. The lower the ratio, the more sensitive per pol-
icy profits are to changes in the constituents of the expense ratio. At 
ratios less than unity, the fact that increasing participating business 
reduces profit should be borne in mind. At ratios near unity, manage-
ment should bear in mind that no increase (or decrease) in the partic-
ipating portfolio will affect returns; a policy of expansion involving 
increasing expenses matched by increasing the sales of participating 
contracts would have only adverse effects on returns. Such companies 
also need to consider the need to meet statutory solvency levels, 
always an important consideration where significant levels of non-
participating business are involved. 
The actual value of the ratio for any particular company will 
determine the required response to adopt for any particular situation: 
for example, when pursuing economies of scale, in determining the 
minimum increase required to the nonparticipating portfolio to cover 
an increase in expense levels. Other management decisions that can 
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be assisted by the response relationships described in this paper 
include: 
a) How can market share be increased most efficiently in order to 
make minimum losses/maximum profits for the participating pol-
icyholders? 
b) When business is falling, to what extent should expenses be 
reduced and which type of business is it most important to retain? 
6 Summary 
The ratio of nonproportionate expenses to total marginal profits 
from nonparticipating business (the expense ratio) is a key factor in 
determining management policy regarding business volume and 
expenses. 
Relationships presented in this paper can be used to determine 
minimum responses required to compensate for changes in any of the 
factors in order to maintain per policy returns and also to assist man-
agement in choosing appropriate strategies for achieving such aims 
as economies of scale, increasing market share, or cost-cutting. 
Decision choices should vary depending on whether the company 
has a low expense ratio (less than 2) or a high expense ratio (greater 
than 2). There are two partially optimum ratios, at R = 1 and R ~ 00, 
both resulting from companies choosing the most efficient methods to 
produce economies of scale at R < 2 and R > 2, respectively. 
It is not sufficient to assume that increasing sales of participating 
contracts will improve per policy returns, as the greater coverage of 
expenses is offset to a greater or lesser extent by the dilution of prof-
its from the nonparticipating portfolio. 
Particularly at low expense ratios, decision choices identified by 
the relationships described in this paper will be constrained by the 
need to meet statutory solvency levels and to maintain adequate 
investment flexibility. Other factors, such as market forces, also can 
affect levels of business. All relevant factors should be considered 
together. 
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Appendix 1 
Let 
Wqx 
nqx = 
wPx 
npx = 
Probability of a participating policyholder at age x dying 
before age x + 1; 
Probability of a nonparticipating policyholder at age x 
dying before age x + 1; 
1- Wqx; 
1- nqx' 
Assume that all participating policies are t year pure endowments 
issued to a life age x. If a participating policyholder dies before the 
policy matures at age x + t, there is a return of the accumulated fund 
at the end of the year of death. The fund is set equal to the partici-
pating policy's asset share on death (including its share of nonpartic-
ipating policy profits and its share of nonproportionate expenses). 
Premiums are level and are paid for t years. 
Define Fk to be the expected fund at time k immediately before 
the payment of the death benefit: 
(A.l) 
where wFk, n Fb and eFk are defined below. 
(A.2) 
k-l W n ( ) 
nh = N n L k-l-r PX+r X rPx X (Hr - n EjP )(1 + i)k-r 
r=O 
(A.3) 
where: 
(A.4) 
(1 +i)-1; 
= Annual gross premium; 
= Per policy proportionate expenses for a single 
participating policy paid at time r; 
Per policy proportionate expenses for a single non-
participating policy paid at time r; 
= Charges paid at time r per nonparticipating policy; and 
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E~n} Total nonproportional expenses at time r. 
Note that the payment (n H r - n EfI}) at time r depends on the 
survival of nonparticipating policyholders to time r. What remains 
of these payments by time k - 1 depends on how many participating 
policyholders survive to time k - 1. Clearly wFb n Fb and eFk are 
actuarial "accumulated" values up to time k - 1 (including both 
interest and mortality) and from time k - 1 to time k using interest 
only. 
The expected actuarial present value of future claims per partici-
pant policy is c where 
t-1 t:o vk+1 x WqX+k X Fk+1 + vt x wpx+t_1 X Ft 
c = Nw (A.S) 
Next, define P~, P n , and E(n} as follows: 
P~ 
t-1 
+ ~Px r (G - wE)p}) vr 
r=O 
(A.6) 
t-1 k W n 
= )' WqX+k r k-rPx+r x rPx X (Hr - n E)p}) v r bO r=O 
(A.7) 
and 
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From the definition of c in equation (A.S), 
t W [WFt N n n Ft _ eFt] 
+ V X Px+t-l N
w 
+ N
w 
X N
n 
N
w 
(A.9) 
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Appendix 2-Model Office Assumptions 
Annual premium = £600 
Proportionate Expenses 
Initial commission 
Renewal commission 
Other initial expenses 
Investment expenses 
Other renewal expenses 
Charges for Unit-Linked Policy 
Initial 
Renewal for commission 
Renewal for fund management charge 
Renewal for other 
Other Assumptions 
Asset accumulation rate 
Rates of mortality and withdrawal 
Tax rates 
Discount rate for calculating present values 
= 50 percent of annual 
premium 
2.5 percent of annual 
premium 
= £60 
= 0.25 percent of accu-
mulated asset share 
at end of each year 
= £6 per annum, inflat-
ing at 7.5 percent per 
annum 
£500 
= 2.5 percent of annual 
premium 
0.5 percent of unit 
fund at end of each 
year 
= £15 inflating at 7.5 
percent per annum 
= 10 percent per annum 
= nil 
= nil 
= 10 percent per annum 
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